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Abstract 
 
The aim of this study was to explore the role of safety in the design of new 
technologies in a high-risk industry. For this study 7 interviews were conducted with 
designers and developers who worked together as a team to develop a new technology 
for the oil and gas industry. The data analysis was done using grounded theory based 
on the ideas of Strauss and Corbin (1990). The analysis showed that the interaction 
between humans and the technology is critical to the safety of the design. Therefore it 
is not possible to base safe design solely on technical features; latent failures are not 
just technical. A more holistic approach to safety is necessary when judging the safety 
of design, and the designer’s understanding of the competencies of the end-users is 
central to this.  
 
 
	   4	  
	  
Table of Contents 
Preface ........................................................................................................................... 2 
Abstract ......................................................................................................................... 3 
Table of Contents .......................................................................................................... 4 
Introduction ................................................................................................................... 5 
Theory ........................................................................................................................... 6 
Theory on design ................................................................................................................... 6 
Human factors in design ........................................................................................................ 8 
Safety and safety culture ...................................................................................................... 10 
Resilience engineering ......................................................................................................... 12 
Method ........................................................................................................................ 12 
Project .................................................................................................................................. 13 
Choice of method ................................................................................................................. 13 
Creation of interview guide ................................................................................................. 15 
Conducting the interviews ................................................................................................... 16 
Data material and analysis ................................................................................................... 16 
Ethical considerations .......................................................................................................... 17 
Results ......................................................................................................................... 18 
Context ................................................................................................................................. 18 
Categories found in the study .............................................................................................. 20 
Outcome categories ............................................................................................................. 26 
Discussion ................................................................................................................... 30 
Validity of the qualitative analysis ...................................................................................... 34 
Limitations of the study ....................................................................................................... 36 
Future research ..................................................................................................................... 37 
Implications of the study ..................................................................................................... 37 
Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 38 
References ................................................................................................................... 39	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	   5	  
	  
Introduction 
The oil and gas industry is a high-risk industry with a high focus on safety 
(Mearns & Yule, 2009). In spite of the high risks associated with this industry, it has 
very few major accidents, and is therefore known to be a high reliability organisation 
(HRO)(Reason, 1997; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007).  
Most of the safety and risk research in this industry has been concerned with 
the sharp-end (Flin, O’Conner, & Crichton, 2008). Whereas little research has been 
done on the impact of the blunt-end on safety. The blunt-end includes design teams 
that are responsible for developing new technologies. These technologies have to be 
efficient as well as safe. Technology carries several latent conditions that can 
contribute to cause an accident (Reason, 1997) under the right, or rather under the 
wrong circumstances.  It is therefore of utmost importance that design teams pay 
attention to the safety aspects of the technology that they are developing. A well-
designed and safe technology is the first line of barriers to preventing a major 
accident.  
Therefore, the research question of this study was:  Which factors influence 
the development of a safe design? 
The aim of this study was to explore the role of safety in the design of new 
technologies in a high-risk industry. Therefore, this study will explore the design 
process of drilling equipment based on new technology within the oil and gas 
industry. Details about the project and the technology cannot be released, due to 
confidentiality matters. The designing, testing, and implementation of a new 
technology is a long and cumbersome iterative process, where the different stages 
have to be repeated until the technology is working properly and safely.  
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Later, the results will be discussed and compared to several theories related to 
safety and safe design in order to compare the developed theory to existing theories. 
These existing theories on safety include human factors in design, general theories 
about safety and resilience engineering (Dekker, Hollnagel, Woods & Cook, 2008).   
The results of this study will contribute to the understanding of the way safety 
is perceived by designers of new technologies. A safe design is the first defence 
against threats in operational safety; it will be valuable to know how designers 
consider safety during the development process.   
In the following sections, the theoretical background of safety will be briefly 
presented before an overview of design, resilience engineering, and human factors in 
design will be given.  
 
Theory 
Theory on design 
 A design process may be described as developing a structure from a function 
(Kroes, 2012). This process consists of various phases. These various phases have 
received different labels by numerous researchers and models. Figure 1 therefore 
presents only an example of such a phase diagram of the engineering design process. 
Generally, an engineering process starts with an order from the customer, followed by 
the creation of specifications based on the order. From there conceptual designs are 
made and compared, then the best option is developed into a prototype, which will be 
implemented (Kroes, 2012; Pahl, Beitz, Felthusen & Grote, 2007).  
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Figure 1. Design process based on Kroes, 2012 p. 138.  
 
For more complex designs these types of models become important for 
managing the design team and project (Kroes, 2012). However, the way that designers 
think is not a linear process. Design thinking is usually represented as an iterative 
process of five stages: (re)define the problem, need finding and benchmarking 
(including: understanding the users and design space), idea generation, prototyping, 
and testing. In reality these five stages are not visited in a predefined order. The 
designers can go from one stage to the next based on experience (Meinel & Leifer, 
2010). 
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Human factors in design  
 Most new technologies today are still designed without adequate consideration 
of human factors (Wickens, Lee, Liu & Becker, 2004). The main priority for the 
designers is the technology, thereby neglecting the usage of the technology from a 
human point of view. As a consequence, poor design is common. In addition, 
technologies become increasingly more complex, making them even more difficult to 
use. If the end-users are consulted at all, it is often after a prototype has already been 
developed. For a design to reach the state of a prototype a lot of resources have 
already been spent. The investment in the initial design will make the designer 
reluctant to change, resulting in a product that is often not suited to satisfying the 
needs of the end-user (Wickens et al., 2004).    
Human-centred design can increase the usability of a system (Norman & 
Draper, 1986). Usability in its turn is associated with increased productivity (so an 
operator can focus on the task instead of the system) reduced human errors, reduced 
training and support, higher levels of acceptance and a better reputation of the system 
(Maguire, 2001).  
In order to achieve more usable systems the human-centred design needs to 
include both end-users and a clear understanding of the end-user and task 
requirements. Moreover, a good division of tasks between humans, software and 
hardware is necessary. Also, using the end-users to evaluate design solutions and 
incorporate their feedback in the further development of the design, are important for 
the usability of a system. Furthermore, design is known to benefit from multi-
disciplinary design teams (Maguire, 2001).  
Even though, human factors have been mostly driven by technology in the 
past (reactive design approach), in the future human factors should drive technology 
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(proactive design approach) (Karwowski, 2007). This view is complicated by the 
designer being under numerous constraints, such a cost, time, reliability, safety, 
environmental impact, ease of use, available resources, manufacturability, regulations, 
laws and politics (Karwowski, 2007). Human factors and ergonomics are a design-
oriented discipline. However, human factors and ergonomic experts do not design 
systems, rather they design the interactions between the systems and humans.  
These interactions have become increasingly more complex due to automation 
in technology. These complex systems require greater integration from a design 
perspective, as well as a management perspective (Karwowski et al., 1994). 
Integration from a design perspective refers to the interactions between hardware, 
organization, information system, and people. Integration from the management 
perspective refers to the interaction between the different system elements, such as 
product quality, workplace and work system design, occupational safety and health, 
and environmental policies (Karwowski, 2007).  
 
Technological change impacts human factors in the existing design. This 
means that it impacts the interaction between man, technology and organisation. As a 
consequence the relationship between these three should be redefined. Technological 
change alters practices and shifts causes of error and strength. In addition, 
technological change is found to increase the pressures and requirements of operators 
even though the intention of the technological change was to decrease demands on the 
operators (Woods & Dekker, 2000). To re-evaluate the safety of a design after a 
technological change three theories on operational safety are presented below. These 
three theories: safety culture, high reliability organisations, and resilience engineering, 
all postulate different views on what makes an organisation operate safely.  
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Safety and safety culture 
 In organisations safety is a trade-off between protection and production. The 
capital of an organisation needs to be invested into production to keep the 
organisation safe from bankruptcy. However, if the organisation solely invests in 
production and not in protection, then the organisation is unprotected from 
catastrophe, and is also unsafe (Reason, 1997). Many hazards threaten the safety of an 
organisation and its employees, especially in high-risk industries. To prevent those 
hazards from harming an organisation’s assets, barriers need to be installed to create 
defensive layers in the technological systems operated by the organisation. 
Nevertheless, Reason (1997) postulates that all defensive layers have weaknesses, 
creating holes in the defensive layers.  
Furthermore, Reason’s (1997) Swiss Cheese model is a metaphor for the 
defence system of organisations, the defensive layers with holes in them are flux and 
the holes can appear and disappear. These holes are created by active failures and 
latent conditions. The active failures are caused by the sharp-end committing unsafe 
acts; the latent conditions are created in the blunt-end, for example by a bad design. 
Neither active failures, nor latent conditions, necessarily need to result in accidents, 
but they hold the potential of contributing to the cause of an accident (Reason, 1997). 
Safety culture is seen as an aspect of the broader concept of organisational 
culture. Much like organisational culture, it is presumed to be a relatively stable 
construct (Cooper, 2000). Safety culture arose after the Chernobyl accident in 1986 
and the Piper Alpha incident in 1988 (Pidgeon, 1998). The Confederation of British 
Industry (CBI, 1991) described safety culture as “the ideas and beliefs that all 
members of the organisation share about risk, accidents and ill health”. Schein (1992) 
said that safety culture relies on core underlying assumptions, which are taken for 
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granted by the whole organisation, adopted beliefs and values, and behaviours and 
artefacts. These definitions of safety culture are relatively similar; they can be 
classified into a normative beliefs perspective (Cooke & Rousseau, 1988). All 
definitions focus on the way people think and/or behave in relation to safety.  
Also, Pidgeon (1998) describes a paradox of safety culture. He suggests that 
while safety culture can make people aware of some hazards, it draws attentions away 
from other hazards. Nevertheless, there are such things as a bad and good safety 
culture. Bad safety culture is characterized by: higher error rates and accident levels, 
failing to communicate appropriately about risk, and wrongly handling new hazards 
(Health & Safety Executive, 1993). A good safety culture, on the other hand, is 
associated with: communications based on mutual trust, shared perceptions of the 
importance of safety, and the positive attitude towards preventive measures (Health & 
Safety Executive, 1993).  
Furthermore, Reason (1997) identified four important components of safety 
culture, namely a good reporting culture, a just culture, a flexible culture, and a 
learning culture. A good reporting culture is characterised by trust. The employees 
need to know that the information they are sharing is dealt with confidentially, that 
there are benefits to reporting, and that reporting is meaningful. A just culture is 
defined by considering the intentions behind actions as well as their consequences. A 
flexible culture is tolerant and flexible when it comes to, for example, task 
descriptions and meeting places. Lastly, a learning culture is characterised by being 
able to detect and react to signals of hazards in a rational way, even when the signals 
are not easy to interpret. Information should be shared both horizontally and vertically 
in the organisation and the communication should be clear (Reason, 1997).  
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Resilience engineering 
 Resilience engineering does not view safety as the absence of error or 
incidents, but rather the safe practice of people operating the system throughout all 
levels of the organisation (Dekker et al., 2008). It is a new way of viewing safety that 
is different from the more standard risk management approaches, which are based on 
concepts such as error calculations, violations, and failure probabilities. Resilience 
engineering emphasises the organisation’s ability to adapt to the complexity of the 
real world. It operates on the assumption that organisations need to monitor and revise 
risk models, while creating processes that are both robust and flexible. In addition to 
having a proactive attitude towards resources once faced with disturbances or 
pressures related to production. Resilience engineering focuses on what sustains or 
erodes the adaptive responses of a system under changing circumstances (Dekker et 
al., 2008).    
 High reliability theory and resilience engineering have a lot in common. They 
both have adopted a rather proactive strategy when dealing with hazards (Hollnagel, 
Woods, & Leveson, 2006). When compared to high reliability theory resilience 
engineering stresses that reliability is not synonym with safety. A system or 
organisation can be reliable, but that does not make it safe. Whereas high reliability 
organisations still use risk management, resilience engineering uses safety 
management (Dekker et al., 2008). 
 
Method 
First the project this thesis was a part of, will be described. Thereafter, I will 
elaborate on the choice of methods that were used to analyse the data, the research 
design and selection of interviewees. Additionally, the process of creating the 
interview guide and conducting the interviews will be described. Furthermore, an 
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explanation of the data material and analysis will be given. Finally, some concluding 
remarks about ethical considerations will be made.  
Project 
This master thesis is a part of an on-going project called the e-centre 
Laboratory for Automated Drilling processes (eLAD) project. eLAD is a project 
financed partly by the Norwegian Research Council and partly by the oil industry. 
There are three collaborating parties in this project: International Research Institute of 
Stavanger (IRIS), Christian Michelsen Research (CMR) in Bergen and Institute for 
Energy Technology (IFE) in Halden. These institutes are linked through 
“Energialliansen”, with the intention of utilising complementary competences.  
The objective of the eLAD project is to build laboratories and facilities to be 
used for developing, designing, evaluating, and optimizing future e-centre based 
working processes, software tools and automation processes. This is done in order to 
provide a unique environment for safe experimentation throughout the planning, and 
execution of drilling operations.  
Choice of method 
 Based on the research objective and question in this study a qualitative 
approach was chosen. Moreover, due to the lack of previous research on this topic it 
was decided to use grounded theory as the specific qualitative approach, and semi-
structured interviews were selected for data gathering. 
 Qualitative research interview. A semi-structured interview is also known as 
qualitative research interview (Kvale, 2007). By choosing a semi-structured interview 
as opposed to a structured interview design, there was room for the interviewee to 
steer the interview into the direction of his or her interpretation of the topic (Kvale, 
2007). This data gathering technique is frequently used in qualitative studies (Kvale, 
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2007), and complements the chosen methodology, grounded theory, well. To fulfil the 
research objective of this study and gain more insight into safety in design in the oil 
and gas industry, several topics related to safety and design such as teamwork, 
communication, automation, and responsibility, were discussed in the interviews. 
These topics can be found in the interview guide. 
 Methodological approach: Grounded theory. Due to the fact that at the 
beginning of the thesis project the researcher did not have much prior knowledge 
about the topic, and the lack of development about this specific topic in the field, the 
study was considered to be appropriate for grounded theory by Strauss and Corbin 
(1990). By using this qualitative method, I developed, discovered and confirmed my 
theory through systematic data collection and analysis (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). The 
process of grounded theory is more circular than linear, and it uses both deductive and 
inductive thinking to let the theory emerge from the naked data. By using the 
techniques of coding, concepts, categories, saturation, and memos, I eventually 
developed a theory (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). Ideally, the researcher should be coding 
during the data gathering, and should be able to go back to his or her original sources, 
the interviewees. I followed the interpretation of Strauss and Corbin of grounded 
theory and used their guidelines to analyse and treat the data material. However, the 
data collection was restricted by the limitation of this study and its participants. 
Therefore, I decided to follow the guidelines of grounded theory as closely as possible 
and adapt the interview guide based on the previous interviews, and accepted that I 
would most likely not be able to go back to the interviewees with further questions.  
Research design and selection of interviewees 
This study set out to develop a better understanding of safety in design of new 
technologies. Since this study is part of the eLAD project there was one particular 
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new technology that could be examined, and therefore this study was designed as a 
case study of the design of that technology. A case study is an analysis of a single unit 
(e.g., a person, group, process, or object) focusing on the developmental factors of 
that unit in relation to the context (Flyvbjerg, 2011).  
 The interviewees were selected based on the selection criterion that they had 
been involved in the design process of the new technology. This was a limited sample. 
To enable comparisons, subjects were selected from different companies that 
contributed to the design project in different roles, the customer, the contractor, and a 
subcontractor, and in order to confirm their statements more than one interviewee was 
selected from each company. The selected interviewees were contacted via email, 
where an explanation of the research project and the objective of the master thesis 
were also given. They were asked to participate in an interview that could either be 
conducted via telephone or videoconference, based on the preference of the 
interviewee. Recruiting participants was difficult due to the busy work schedule of the 
sample. The study included interviews with 7 interviewees. 
Creation of interview guide 
 The interview guide was semi-structured, which meant that it had a fixed set 
of questions deemed relevant for the thesis’ topic and objective (Kvale, 2007). The 
interview guide was created based on brain storm sessions with my supervisors on 
which themes could be interesting to further develop the understanding of safety in 
the design of new technologies. Due to the requirements of grounded theory regarding 
the naivety of the researcher I did not submerge myself in the literature surrounding 
this topic during the development of the questionnaire (Strauss & Corbin, 1990).   
The interview guide that was used for this study consisted of three main 
categories, namely the work process, safety, and the end-users. Each category had a 
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number of subcategories, which included more detailed questions. Furthermore, the 
interview guide was discussed after every interview with one of my supervisors. 
During these discussions it was decided whether we needed to adapt the interview 
guide based on our observations of the appropriateness of the questions, the flow of 
the interview, and the answers that the interviewees gave.   
Conducting the interviews 
 The interviews were conducted in Norwegian or English (depending on the 
preference of the interviewee), either over the telephone or videoconference. The 
interviewees were sitting in their own respective offices where they would not be 
disturbed for the duration of the interviews. These set-ups were chosen so that they 
were least inconveniencing for the interviewees (Kvale, 2007). Moreover, the 
interviews were recorded with an audio-recorder. The participant was notified before 
the start of the interview about the use of the recorder and was asked for consent. The 
interview only started after the participant had consented to the recording. 
 During the interviews the interview guide was mainly used as a guide to 
ensure that most of the main topics were discussed and as a red thread throughout the 
interview. However, when an interviewee digressed from the topic with an interesting 
thought, this was further explored. This allowed for insights to develop, which would 
not have been possible in a non-semi-structured interview (Kvale, 2007). 
Data material and analysis 
After the interviews were conducted, they were transcribed, and my supervisor 
checked the transcriptions to ensure that no data was left out or wrongly noted. The 
transcriptions were anonymized to ensure that information from the interviews could 
not be traced back to the source.  
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 The coding and analysing techniques used in this study were developed based 
on the Strauss and Corbin’s (1990) interpretation of grounded theory. NVIVO was 
used to code the data. The interviews judged to be richest were first coded using line-
by-line coding. This method was chosen to make best use out of those rich interviews. 
This was done for four interviews; thereafter the remaining interviews were less 
rigidly coded with focus on themes that had not come up in the other interviews. After 
all interviews had been coded, they were further analysed and sorted into categories. 
These categories were formed using the guiding question of what the codes had in 
common. Based on a combination of inductive and deductive thinking these 
categories were reassessed and categorised on a higher, more abstract level.  
Throughout the process categories were compared to the original data material to 
decide whether the category was valid, and memos were written for future reference 
(Strauss & Corbin, 1990).    
Ethical considerations 
The project was reported to and approved by the Norwegian ethical committee 
(NSD), before the start of the data collection. Before the participants started the 
interview they were informed about their rights and terms of participation. They were 
told they could stop at any time, did not have to answer questions they did not want 
to, and that the interview was confidential.  The participants were asked to orally 
consent to these terms of participation, and only then could the interview start. The 
two people who had access to the non-anonymised recordings of the interview were 
my supervisor and I. We were also both present during the interviews.  
Moreover, during the coding and reporting of the data no information will be 
given that could be traced back to the original source. Here by ensuring the anonymity 
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of the participants of the study. Therefore, no references will be made to the gender, 
age, or occupation of the participant.  
Furthermore, all recordings of the interviews, audio recordings, transcriptions, 
and notes, will be destroyed once the project is finished.   
 
Results 
This section will first present the context, where after the results are presented 
as categories in accordance to grounded theory, and visualised as a model. To 
illustrate how the categories are grounded in the data collected, a table with quotes is 
presented (see table 1 and 2). 
Context 
The context is the background from which the interviewees respond to in 
actions and emotions (Corbin & Strauss, 2008). In order to provide a framework for 
these actions and emotions the local context of this study will be presented. The 
context will be described based on three categories: the technology, the work 
environment and organisations, and the end-users. The information presented in the 
context categories originates from the data gathered in the interviews. Hereafter the 
results will be presented as categories in accordance to grounded theory, and 
visualised as a model. To illustrate how these categories are grounded in the data 
collected, a table with quotes is presented. 
The technology. The technology that was to be developed needed to enable 
the drilling of wells that were not accessible with conventional drilling equipment. 
The conventional drilling equipment relied on manual usage, whereas the technology 
that was to be developed would be automated. The designers had to look for a drilling 
solution that was suitable for the circumstances. 
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The work environment and organisations involved. For the design and 
development of this new technology the customer hired designers from several 
companies. The customer recruited one main contractor; who was made responsible 
for designing the new technology. Since the technology was so complex several 
subcontractors were also hired to develop individual parts of the technology. The 
main contractor and the sub-contractors that were hired by the customer had regular 
meetings. The project leaders of these companies met in these meetings with the 
project leader of the customer company. Here they discussed the development of the 
design, presented progress, and performed risk analyses. Sometimes experts were 
brought into these meetings to contribute to a specific topic, for example risk analysis.  
With exception of these meetings the designers worked relatively 
independently. Often they also had teams within their own company working on the 
development of the new technology.  
For this study people from the project working for the customer company, 
main contractor company, and subcontracting company that developed a model, were 
interviewed.  
The end-users. The end-users of the developed drilling equipment based on 
new technology are the people working offshore on a drilling rig. The educational 
background of the end-users ranges from plumber to a university degree as an 
engineer. They have a very typical work culture offshore due to the special working 
conditions. The end-users typically work on a two weeks offshore, 4 weeks onshore 
basis, and at the platform they work in an enclosed 24-hour society where they work 
12-hour shifts, one-week day shifts and one-week night shifts. Furthermore, the work 
environment is limited in space and very noisy, dirty, and part of a high-risk industry. 
Within this industry it is normal that the contracts for certain services are taken over 
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by other companies. So for example the drilling contract could be taken over by 
another company after a few years. This was described by one of the interviewees as 
usually just a change of the shell and not the actual crew. Nonetheless, every company 
has slight differences in their approach.  
The end-users can be divided into different categories, namely the drillers, the 
drilling crew, and the operators. Furthermore, the end-users working with this new 
technology work (on paper) for different companies, which increases the complexity 
of the situation. Nevertheless, when operating the new drilling equipment it is very 
important that they work well together and have a clear communication. Especially 
when the people that need to work together are at separate locations on the offshore 
platform. There is also a very strict hierarchy offshore that is respected by the end-
users.  
What is more, the designers often described the end-users, at first, as being 
conservative and highly reluctant to change. However, after some interaction with 
them the designers admitted to be surprised by the inquisitive attitude of the end-
users.   
Categories found in the study  
The core category found in this study was the understanding of the end-users’ 
competencies. The relation between the main categories and the core category can be 
defined as how the understanding of the end-users’ competencies is expressed. The 
main categories are: training of the end-user, proximity to the end-user, experience 
transfer from previous projects, automation vs. human action, and learning from tests.  
The variables that are affected by the understanding of the end-users 
competence are all aspects of the end product, the new drilling technology. These are 
called outcome variables, and there are four of them: user-friendliness of the product, 
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perceived safety of the product, complexity of the product, and cost of the product. 
Table 1 and figure 2 show the categories and some example quotes that ground the 
categories in the data. These categories will be further explained in the sections 
below. 
Core category: Understanding of the end-users’ competencies. The core 
category that emerged from the data was the designers’ understanding of the 
competencies of the end-users. The drillers, the drilling crew, and the operators 
needed to work directly with the new drilling equipment. The core category reflected 
how the designers understood their competencies. In reality the background of the 
end-users ranged from plumber to engineer. The successfulness of the design 
depended, amongst other things, on how well the designers understood who the end-
users were and what their competencies were. Newly designed equipment that is not 
well adapted to the existing competencies has consequences for the economics of the 
project as well as the safety of the end-result. 
Furthermore, what emerged from the data during the analysis was that this 
understanding of the end-users’ competencies differed for the three types of actors 
involved in the design of the technology; the customer, main contractor, and sub-
contractor. The subcontracting company indicated that they were very unaccustomed 
to operational projects like the one of developing this new equipment. They said that 
usually they were more involved with research projects, and that they do not have 
routines for developing commercial products. Therefore, they had less experience 
with user-centred design, and minimal experience with the end-users. This led to a 
mismatch in the sub-contractor’s understanding of the end-users’ competencies.  
 The understanding of the competencies of the end-users can be broken down 
in three concepts: understanding, competencies, and end-users. The topics that were 
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discussed during the interviews could almost always be led back to one of these three 
topics, or a combination of them. They were expressed in five ways, as can be seen in 
table 1; the need for training, the experience transfer from previous projects onto this 
project, how close the designers were to the end-users, how well they learned from the 
tests, and the attitude towards human error. These main categories will be further 
explained in the sections below. Furthermore, the consequences of the understanding 
of the end-users’ competencies for the product will be discussed with illustration of 
the main outcome categories: user-friendliness, complexity, and the perceived safety 
of the product. 
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Figure 2. Understanding of the end-users’ competencies model
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Table 1. The main categories, their explanation, and illustrative quotes.   
Main	  Categories	   Quote	  
Training	  of	  end-­‐user	  	  
The	  need	  for	  training	  is	  recognition	  that	  
the	  competency	  level	  of	  the	  end-­‐user	  
needs	  to	  be	  developed.	  For	  this	  
technology	  training	  was	  deemed	  
important,	  however,	  the	  end-­‐users	  did	  
not	  have	  all	  the	  means	  to	  train.	  
You	  have	  to	  have	  the	  whole	  crew	  in	  [technology]-­‐modus.	  I	  think	  
that	  the	  next	  time	  we	  will	  do	  an	  operation	  that	  we	  need	  to	  
include	  larger	  parts	  of	  the	  drilling	  crew	  in	  the	  training.	  	  
	  
Yes	  we	  noticed	  quickly	  that	  there	  was	  much	  variation	  from	  
person	  to	  person,	  but	  some	  became	  very	  unsure	  about	  what	  
they	  should	  do.	  And	  they	  have	  their	  usual	  driller’s	  first	  action	  
that	  when	  something	  happens	  you	  do	  this	  and	  that.	  But	  with	  
[the	  new	  technology]	  it	  might	  be	  completely	  wrong	  to	  do	  that.	  
It	  messes	  with	  people’s	  intuitive	  reaction.	  	  
	  
There	  is	  a	  lot	  of	  focus	  on	  that	  (communication),	  especially	  
before	  the	  first	  operation.	  	  There	  was	  a	  lot	  of	  focus	  on	  this	  and	  
there	  were	  big	  meetings	  and	  teambuildings	  and	  joint	  training	  in	  
a	  simulator	  and	  such	  with	  [the	  subcontractor]	  and	  the	  whole	  rig	  
crew.	  
	  
Proximity	  to	  the	  end-­‐user	  
The	  proximity	  of	  the	  designer	  to	  the	  end-­‐
users.	  Proximity	  is	  interpreted	  in	  this	  
category	  how	  well	  the	  designer	  
understands	  the	  end-­‐user,	  how	  close	  are	  
they.	  
(about	  the	  inclusion	  of	  the	  end-­‐user)	  It	  was	  a	  conscious	  
strategy,	  because	  those	  who	  will	  operate	  the	  equipment	  are	  the	  
ones	  with	  the	  best	  competencies	  on	  how	  things	  will	  work	  in	  
practice.	  	  
	  
(from	  one	  of	  the	  interviewees	  from	  the	  subcontracting	  
company)	  In	  the	  first	  phase,	  before	  we	  started	  drilling	  the	  first	  
well	  we	  did	  not	  know	  them	  (the	  end-­‐users).	  We	  had	  an	  
understanding	  of	  what	  drilling	  includes	  and	  such,	  but	  after	  we	  
had	  been	  offshore	  for	  the	  first	  well	  we	  learned	  a	  lot	  about	  the	  
situation	  and	  how	  they	  (the	  end-­‐users)	  work.	  	  	  
	  
Experience	  transfer	  from	  previous	  
projects	  	  
Experience	  was	  transferred	  from	  the	  first	  
project	  to	  the	  second	  without	  
consideration	  of	  the	  difference	  in	  
competency	  level	  of	  the	  end-­‐users	  and	  
the	  accompanying	  consequences.	  
I	  have	  to	  say	  that	  I	  see	  a	  bit	  of	  a	  difference	  between	  the	  
questions	  we	  get	  and	  forums	  that	  we	  attend	  and	  have	  meetings	  
on	  and	  stuff,	  and	  maybe	  there	  is	  a	  bit	  higher	  competency	  level	  at	  
[first	  platform]	  than	  on	  [current	  platform].	  
Automation	  vs.	  Human	  action	  
The	  attitude	  the	  designer	  has	  towards	  
human	  error	  determines	  the	  way	  he	  or	  
she	  will	  approach	  safety.	  Human	  action	  is	  
seen	  by	  the	  designer	  as	  a	  necessary	  evil,	  
therefore	  the	  designer	  will	  try	  to	  avoid	  
human	  action	  and	  thereby	  in	  their	  view	  
human	  error.	  
…some	  of	  the	  point	  is	  that	  if	  we	  can	  avoid	  that	  things	  have	  to	  be	  
solved	  by	  human	  action	  then	  it	  is	  often	  safer.	  
	  
….	  and	  again,	  it	  requires	  that	  the	  competency	  level	  of	  the	  
people	  we	  send	  out	  has	  to	  change.	  They	  have	  to	  be	  able	  to	  
handle	  this	  type	  of	  systems.	  	  
	  
Learning	  based	  on	  tests	  
The	  adjustments	  that	  were	  made	  to	  the	  
technology	  based	  on	  observations,	  
analyses,	  or	  test	  results.	  The	  dynamic	  
process	  of	  designing	  a	  new	  technology	  
offers	  the	  opportunity	  to	  experience	  a	  
learning	  curve.	  For	  the	  subcontractor	  this	  
learning	  curve	  was	  probably	  steepest.	  
…there	  were	  88	  points	  that	  had	  to	  change	  in	  the	  procedures	  
that	  we	  could	  not	  do	  as	  we	  had	  thought.	  So	  we	  had	  to	  try	  it,	  
because	  when	  you	  test	  things	  in	  reality	  things	  are	  very	  different	  
from	  on	  paper.	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Main category: Training of end-user. Analyses showed varying views on 
training of the end-users by the interviewees. Everyone agreed that the end-users 
should receive some form of training, however the opinions differed on how well this 
was done and how much training they needed. Training was also the area where most 
interviewees indicated there were some challenges within the project. The indicated 
need for training is a reflection of the way the designers perceived the competency 
level of the end-users, and where they believe the greatest challenges of the human-
technology interaction, and human-human interaction lie.  
The contractor indicated that they had very stable training routines for their 
crew, and that they tried to include the rest of the personnel as much as possible 
within training procedures for the new technology. The contractor also admitted to 
having experienced some problems with the subcontractor training the contractor’s 
crew in the part of the technology that the subcontractor developed.  
Furthermore, some interviewees recognised the importance of training, 
because some of the features of the new automated technology are counter-intuitive 
compared to the manual technology they previously used. Also, the cooperation and 
communication between the two teams that are primarily involved in operating the 
new technology, is stressed as being important and should be trained intensively.   
Main category: Experience transfer from previous projects. The new 
technology has been implemented on different petroleum producing installations. On 
the first installation the competencies of the end-users were different from the 
competencies of end-users in the current study. The general competency level at the 
first installation was described as being higher than on the one at hand in this study. 
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Nonetheless, the experience from the first project was transferred to this 
project with seemingly little consideration of that difference in competency level. The 
implementation phase on the first platform was described as smoother than on this 
platform, where problems with the user-friendliness of the technology kept 
reoccurring.  
Main category: Automation vs. human action. Avoiding human action was 
seen as safer, and almost all interviewees generally preferred automation. So in order 
to reduce human error more automation was needed. However, this view on human 
action (and thereby competencies of the end-users) and the resulting increased 
automation has consequences for the tasks of the end-user. Their tasks change; less 
people are needed to operate more automated technologies, but the number of systems 
to watch increases. Moreover, the systems and technologies increase in complexity, 
which requires a different set of competencies to operate these systems. 
Main category: Proximity to end-user. The main category proximity 
concerns the distance between the designer and the end-user. How well can the 
designers relate to the working conditions of the end-users and to the end-users 
themselves? The distance between the two is often reduced by experience of working 
together, and inclusion of the end-users in the design processes (from the beginning). 
The inclusion of the end-user was very important for the customer, and throughout the 
design process different end-users were invited to join risk analyses and reviews of 
the design. Interviewees from the subcontracting company expressed that they learned 
a lot about the rig and well operation after the training period, two months before the 
first operation using the new technology. However, prior to that encounter they 
admitted to not having a good understanding of who the end-users really were. Their 
understanding was mainly based on stereotypes.  
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 Main category: Learning based on tests. A designing process is a dynamic 
process. The different stages of the design process are re-evaluated based on new 
information or outcomes from analyses and tests. In the process of developing this 
new drilling technology the designers, especially those from the subcontracting 
company, developed their understanding of the competencies of the end-users. They 
observed, mainly during the testing and implementation phases offshore, who the end-
users really were, what worked, and, most importantly, what did not work. Based on 
these observations adjustments were made. These adjustments, or attempts to adjust 
the technology to better suit the needs of the end-user, demonstrate learning.  
Outcome categories 
In figure 2 an outcome category was included, namely the product.  This 
category will be presented as an outcome of the designers’ understanding of the 
competencies of the end-users. The product of the design project is the developed 
technology, and here it will be discussed how the understanding of the competencies 
of the end-users have influenced the outcome of the design. The categories that 
emerged from the data describing the characteristics of the final product were the 
user-friendliness of the product, the complexity of the product, the perceived safety of 
the product, and the cost of the product.  
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Main	  Outcome	  
Categories	  	  
Quote	  
User-­‐friendliness	  of	  the	  product	  
User-­‐friendliness	  refers	  to	  ease	  with	  
which	  the	  end-­‐user	  is	  able	  to	  use	  the	  
new	  technology.	  This	  implies	  that	  the	  
technology	  should	  be	  intuitive,	  and	  
adapted	  to	  the	  competence	  level	  of	  
the	  end-­‐user.	  However,	  some	  parts	  of	  
the	  technology	  were	  not	  well	  adapted	  
to	  the	  competencies	  of	  the	  end-­‐user.	  
…and	  we	  had	  to	  develop	  a	  commercial	  user	  interface	  that	  they	  
had	  to	  use.	  There	  were	  no	  strict	  limits	  other	  than	  that	  it	  should	  be	  
commercial	  and	  user-­‐friendly.	  	  	  
	  
There	  are	  absolutely	  challenges	  with	  using	  this	  [sub-­‐contractor]	  
model.	  It	  has	  a	  complex	  HMI.	  	  	  	  	  
	  
…but	  that	  it	  should	  be	  intuitive	  was	  a	  bit	  difficult,	  that	  was	  
maybe	  not	  that	  we	  did	  best	  because	  the	  model	  requires	  things	  to	  
be	  in	  a	  special	  way.	  A	  part	  of	  the	  data	  that	  is	  to	  be	  entered	  is	  
something	  that	  people	  do	  not	  have	  a	  special	  relation	  to,	  it	  is	  
detailed	  lab	  data	  […]	  for	  example,	  and	  there	  are	  very	  few	  people	  
that	  understand	  how	  it	  should	  be.	  Some	  of	  the	  challenges	  here	  
are	  that	  we	  who	  worked	  at	  (subcontractor)	  we	  know	  quite	  well	  
what	  it	  is	  we	  need	  and	  how	  it	  should	  look,	  but	  when	  you	  then	  
train	  a	  (contractor)	  who	  might	  come	  straight	  from	  technical	  
school	  or	  something	  like	  that,	  they	  have	  slightly	  different	  
assumptions	  both	  for	  usage	  and	  understanding	  what	  is	  right	  and	  
what	  is	  wrong.	  	  	  
Perceived	  safety	  of	  the	  product	  
The	  view	  on	  safety	  is	  mainly	  expressed	  
in	  terms	  of	  risk	  analyses	  and	  testing.	  
The	  customer	  had	  made	  safety	  a	  
priority	  and	  this	  was	  clearly	  expressed	  
by	  the	  main	  and	  sub-­‐contractor	  as	  
well.	  Overall,	  the	  technology	  was	  
deemed	  to	  be	  safe	  in	  spite	  of	  
problems	  with	  user-­‐friendliness	  and	  
training.	  
(about	  safety)…the	  way	  we	  find	  out	  about	  that	  is	  via	  HAZOP	  
functions	  or	  HAZIDs.	  
	  
(about	  measuring	  safety)…you	  are	  measuring	  safety,	  or	  you	  are	  
measuring	  the	  amount	  of	  accidents	  over	  time.	  And	  if	  the	  
frequency	  is	  higher	  than	  this	  and	  this	  number	  than	  we	  have	  to	  
find	  a	  reducing	  measure.	  
	  
Both	  in	  international	  law,	  [national	  law]	  and	  [the	  standard].	  The	  
[standard]	  is	  the	  official	  demand	  we	  have	  to	  meet,	  but	  we	  have	  
much	  stricter	  demands	  than	  what	  it	  says	  in	  [the	  standard].	  	  
	  
Haha…the	  cost.	  It	  was	  expensive,	  it	  was	  an	  expensive	  
undertaking,	  but	  I	  believe	  that	  safety-­‐wise	  and	  design-­‐wise	  we	  
did	  a	  lot	  of	  things	  right.	  
Complexity	  of	  the	  product	  
The	  product	  is	  considered	  to	  be	  
complex	  due	  to	  the	  amount	  of	  
equipment	  necessary	  to	  use	  the	  
technology,	  the	  complex	  HMI	  of	  the	  
model,	  and	  the	  involvement	  of	  several	  
actors	  during	  the	  operation	  phase.	  
There	  is	  a	  lot	  of	  interest	  and	  use	  for	  this	  technology,	  but	  it	  is	  a	  bit	  
difficult	  to	  start	  using	  it.	  Because	  it	  demands	  more	  equipment	  
and	  new	  equipment,	  which	  has	  not	  been	  used	  before	  and	  this	  is	  a	  
bit	  of	  a	  conservative	  business.	  	  
Cost	  of	  the	  product	  
The	  design	  project	  was	  very	  costly.	  
However,	  the	  alternations	  that	  are	  still	  
deemed	  necessary	  will	  further	  
increase	  the	  total	  cost.	  
And	  [subcontracting	  company’s	  personnel]	  is	  expensive	  to	  use,	  so	  
it	  is	  not	  desirable	  to	  have	  them	  out	  there.	  	  
	  
They	  have	  invested	  a	  lot	  of	  money	  in	  that	  (model),	  when	  it	  comes	  
to	  development	  and	  testing	  and	  modifying	  of	  the	  model.	  
	  
But	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  day	  [the	  customer]	  has	  invested	  a	  lot	  of	  
money	  in	  the	  [subcontractor’s]	  model	  and	  it	  would	  be	  good	  to	  get	  
to	  the	  point	  where	  that	  was	  a	  commercially	  available	  package	  
that,	  you	  know,	  engineers	  throughout	  [customer’s	  company]	  
could	  be	  trained	  upon.	  	  
Table 2. The outcome categories, their explanation, and illustrative quotes.  
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Main outcome category: User-friendliness of the product. One of the 
objectives of the design project was that the new technology should be user-friendly. 
However, in order to make a technology user-friendly knowledge of the end-user is 
required. A recurring topic whilst talking about the new technology with the 
interviewees was the challenges with the user-friendliness of the model of the 
subcontractor. They themselves indicated that the objective of their work was that the 
model should be user-friendly and commercial.  
It seemed that there was a mismatch between the end-users’ actual 
competence and wishes, and the designers’ understanding of the end users’ need to 
make the technology user-friendly. The challenges with the user-friendliness of the 
model were assigned to the complex Human Machine Interface (HMI) of the model. 
The contractor had proposed to the customer that the next upgrade of the model 
should focus on user-friendliness.  
Main outcome category: Complexity of the product. The final product has a 
high level of complexity. In order to operate the technology a lot of equipment is 
needed and needs to be mobilised. In addition to this large amount of equipment that 
is needed, several of the different parts of the equipment are owned by different 
companies, which need to be present to operate their own parts as well as to cooperate 
and communicate with the other parties involved under the complex drilling 
operations. Even though this situation is not unusual in the offshore working 
environment, it contributed to the high-complexity level of the drilling operation 
(using this new technology). Moreover, the HMI that is behind the computer model 
used to steer the operation is also very complex. The HMI has been described earlier 
as not user-friendly.  
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 Overall, the product is evaluated as being complex and it is debated if the 
competency level of the end-users is high enough to safely operate the complex 
technology.  
Main outcome category: Costs of the product. An additional consequence 
of the product and the understanding of the end-users’ competencies are the costs that 
are associated with the project. The project was already an expensive endeavour and 
safety was said to be prioritized over cost pressures. However, due to complications 
with the understanding of the end-users’ competencies, modifications will have to be 
made to the HMI of the model to increase the user-friendliness of the design. These 
modifications will have serious consequences for the budget. Additional costs will 
have to be included in the total costs of this design project. Spending more money on 
the modifications of the model will mean that there is less money to spend on other 
project areas.  
Main outcome category: Perceived safety of the product. From the 
interview data a view on safety emerges, as can be seen in figure 2. Here it was found 
that risk analysis was used not only to measure safety, but also to express safety. In 
the risk analysis the risks in the design are analysed, and the barriers that are present 
are evaluated to judge if they can counterbalance the found risks. If this is not the 
case, then (based on the results from the risk analyses) appropriate barriers, either, 
software, hardware, procedural, or a combination of the three, are implemented into 
the design. The safety of the design is further expressed by the results from several 
testing phases. If the tests run without any problems, then this is additional proof for 
the designers that the design is safe. The focus in the assessment of the safety of the 
design is technical. The interviewees indicated that human factors specialists were 
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called in for certain analyses. The focus whilst talking about safety remained more 
technical than operational.  
Safety was described as a priority within this project. The designers said that they 
were working with standards that were even stricter than required by either national or 
international law. The overall conclusion of the interviewees was that the technology 
is safe to use at the moment, despite that, they express worries about the user-
friendliness of the model and the training opportunities for the end-users. The training 
opportunities with the technology are restricted due to limited drilling operations and 
the lack of a simulator at the moment. These challenges compromise the overall safety 
of the technology. From a technical perspective the technology appears to do what it 
is supposed to do; nonetheless it was made by people and has to be operated by 
people, and thereby it is subject to human error. The overall safety the technology is a 
combination of the technical safety and the operational safety. The latter is dependent 
on human factors, such as the competencies of the end-users. It is therefore of the 
utmost importance that the people that design technologies have a correct 
understanding of what those competencies are.  
 
Discussion 
The analyses of the data showed that safety or a safe product is about more 
than merely following the rules and laws imposed on the design and design process. 
The core category that arose from the data in this study concerned the importance of 
understanding the end-users’ competencies in relation to the safety of the product. 
The understanding of the end-users’ competencies was based on the training of end-
user, the experience transferred from previous projects onto this project, the attitude 
towards human action vs. automation, the proximity to the end-users, and learning 
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based on the tests run on the new technology. They serve as indicators of the level of 
that understanding.  
The level of understanding of the end-users’ competencies was not the same 
for all companies that were interviewed; some had a more accurate understanding 
than others. These differences in understanding were caused by differences in the five 
main underlying categories previously mentioned.  
 Moreover, the differences in the level of understanding of the end-users’ 
competencies had consequences for the final product. These consequences were 
prominent in four outcome indicators: user-friendliness, complexity, costs, and 
perceived safety. The product showed a high complexity with a low user-friendliness. 
Nevertheless, the product is viewed and evaluated, through risk analyses, as being 
safe. As a consequence of the difficulties with the technology the costs of the project 
have been very high and are still increasing. 
 
Answering the initial research question (Which factors influence the 
development of a safe design?) based on the data analyses is difficult. There have 
been several aspects of this design and design process that have contributed to the 
safety of the product. However, I would describe the core category that emerged from 
the data, the understanding of the end-users’ competencies, as the main factor that 
influenced the safety of the design in this study. The prerequisite for a safe design is 
for the designers to understand the end-users’ competencies. This would require the 
designers to involve the end-users in an early design stage and familiarise themselves 
with the end-users’ working environment. This increases the proximity between the 
end-users and designers. Additionally, this will help to judge whether the experiences 
from other projects can be transferred directly, or should be adapted to the 
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competency level of the current end-users. Furthermore, these insights into their 
competency levels make it easier to decide which parts of the technology that should 
be automated and which parts can be dealt with by human action. Consequently, the 
training would be adjusted better and more appropriate. Finally, the test results that 
reflect the end-users’ competency level should lead to changes being made in the 
design.  
These actions can have an effect on the outcome product: the drilling 
technology. With an increased understanding of the end-users’ competencies the 
technology would be likely to be more user-friendly, less complex, less costly, and 
safer. It would be more user-friendly and less complex due to the better adapted user-
interfaces based on the understanding the designers would have of the end-users 
competencies, safer because the technology would be more intuitive to use and this 
would decrease the chances of human error, and less costly because there would be no 
need for changes in the design in later phases of the design process.  
The model would thereby predict that optimizing the input variables of the 
core category would increase the understanding of the end-users’ competencies and as 
a consequence increase the user-friendliness and safety, and reduce the cost of the 
project and the complexity of the technology. To determine whether the model is 
complete is a challenging task, and I would recommend this to be done with a 
quantitative study using for example structural equation modelling.  
The factors that have been identified in the analysis are, however, not 
completely new according to other theories concerning human factors in design. In 
software design there has been a much more rigorous focus on user-centred 
engineering (e.g., Nielson, 1993). This user-centred design has four approaches to 
design: 
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- Early focus on the users and tasks 
- Performing empirical studies such as usability tests and questionnaires 
focusing on quantitative data 
- Iterative design using prototyping, allowing for quick changes based on 
feedback from the users 
- Participatory design were users are part of the design team 
These approaches would have allowed for the designers involved in the current study 
to learn from tests, get closer to the end-users, put the experience from the previous 
project in a better informed context, know what new aspects could be trained for, and 
give a better informed input into their decision for human action or automation.  
The goal of any human factors specialist within a design team would be to 
develop a design that supports the needs of the end-users instead of developing a 
design that the end-users would have to adapt to. Even though humans are flexible 
and capable of learning, technologies would be safer, less complex, user-friendlier if 
they were designed based on the needs and competencies of the end-users. Such 
awareness is present amongst the designers of software, however is not yet installed in 
the oil and gas industry.     
These findings are congruent with existing theories on design. It appears the 
designers in this project did not fully understand whom they were designing for. This 
lack of human factors in design is common (Wickens, et al., 2004). The fact that end-
users were barely involved in the design process and as a consequence, that their 
competencies were not fully understood, showed in the outcome categories. Theories 
on human factors in design emphasise that design was previously more technology 
driven and had characteristics of reactive design. In the future designers should let 
human factors drive design and opt for a proactive design approach, as proposed by 
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Karwowski (2007). This is similar to resilience engineering (Hollnagel, Woods, & 
Leveson, 2006), which also claims to focus more on the flexibility of the system, 
namely the technology in interaction with the humans operating it.  
All interviewees mentioned that there was a lot of focus on safety during the 
design process. The perceived safety of the developed technology was high. 
Nevertheless, the interviewees themselves indicated that there were problems with the 
complexity and user-friendliness of the model. I would therefore like to derive that 
there was a high focus on technical safety, on the reliability of the technology. 
However, they seem to have less consideration for operational safety. This lack of 
awareness of operational safety is not unexpected. During the design phase a lot of the 
focus is given to the actual technology, and less on the people who will use the 
technology in the future. This is evident from the many different types of risk 
analyses that were performed in the duration of the design process. These types of risk 
analyses traditionally have a higher focus on technical safety than on operational 
safety.  
 However, it is evident that the high complexity of a technology and lacking 
user-friendliness increase the likelihood of human errors (Hollnagel, Woods, & 
Leveson, 2006). Higher awareness of human factors during the early design phases of 
developing a new technology could increase the designer’s understanding of the end-
users’ competencies and thereby aid the development of a safer and more economic 
design.  
Validity of the qualitative analysis 
In order to evaluate the value of a study the terms validity, reliability, and 
objectivity are usually discussed. However, for qualitative studies these terms are not 
very applicable due to the methodological differences between quantitative and 
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qualitative studies (Yardley, 2000). Yardley (2000) proposes to evaluate qualitative 
studies based on the sensitivity to context, the commitment and rigor of the 
researcher, the transparency and coherence, and the impact and importance of the 
study.  
The data has been analysed in the context of the study. The context has been 
described in the result section and the interpretation of the model should be made in 
light of this context. Even though some findings might be transferable to other cases 
they should never be taken out of context.  
The commitment and the rigor of the study have been assured by the structural 
use of grounded theory and the iterative processes that lie underneath the 
methodology. This method was used to produce a model; this model is supported not 
only by the structural use of the method, but is also made transparent by the 
documentation of the method as well as by the use of illustrative quotes that support 
the model. The categorisations and interpretations have been made by closely 
following the guidelines stipulated by grounded theory (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). 
Moreover, any deviations from this approach have been explained and discussed in 
sections above. The transparency of the study was further promoted by informing the 
interviewees that they could and should speak freely, that their data would be 
anonymised, and that only my supervisor and I would have access to it.  
The study shows coherency by letting the research question determine the 
method and subjects of the analyses. The research question lent itself for the choice of 
the grounded theory method and since the research question focused on safety in 
design of new technologies only designers of new technologies were interviewed.  
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Limitations of the study 
A limitation of the validity of this study is that the data is gathered in 
retrospect. The interviewees were talking about their experiences of developing the 
new technology after the fact; we were not able to follow the process as it went on. 
The study is therefor reliant on the quality of the retrieved memories of the 
interviewees. Previous studies have proven that memories might be incomplete and or 
biased (Anderson, Bjork & Bjork, 1994; Kahneman, Tversky & Slovic, 1982).  
 Furthermore, another limitation to this study was that the interviews were 
generally conducted in Norwegian, which is not my mother tongue. This could cause 
misunderstandings during the analysis of the data or cause the loss of information. 
However, my supervisors are native Norwegian speakers and one of them was a 
second analyst during this study.   
 An additional limitation of the study was not being able to go back to the 
interviewees. In accordance with grounded theory the researcher should be able to go 
back to the interviewees to ask additional questions based on new questions that arise 
from analyses. Unfortunately, due to our specific sample this was not possible. 
Nonetheless, the interview guide was evaluated after every interview to accommodate 
new insights and to include new questions and themes. Moreover, several designers 
working for the same companies were interviewed so that we could verify information 
or ask new questions that were related to the role of the company during the 
development of the new technology.      
 The data that was gathered for this study could have been interpreted and 
categorised in a different way. There is a subjective quality to the study, regardless of 
the intentions of the researcher to remain as objective as possible. Nonetheless, the 
results are to be judged as valid. During the analyses there was a second analyst 
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conducting a grounded theory study, independently, based on the same data. This 
second analyst, my second supervisor, came to similar conclusions.  
 
Future research 
 The categories found in this study could be used to develop a questionnaire. 
This could help further quantify the importance of the factors found to influence a 
safe design. Additionally, it would be interesting to further explore other design 
projects to identify factors that are stable across different types of projects. In that 
same vein it would be fascinating to see if these factors are similar cross-culturally. In 
this globalised world where design projects are often international it would be 
interesting to research if culture influences what is viewed as safe design.  
 Human factors in design are often poorly analysed (Woods & Dekker, 2000). 
This study shows the need for such analyses. According to Woods and Dekker (2000) 
the analyses that are performed are often taking shortcuts and do little justice to the 
importance of human factors in design. There is a need for studies that are able to 
analyse the complexity of the interaction between humans and machines. Woods and 
Dekker (2000) have proposed scenario-based analyses as a solution for the analysis of 
human factors and technological change. Further research should look into further 
developing these ideas into workable analyses with an emphasis on the designer 
understanding the competencies of the end-users.  
Implications of the study 
 The study found that the understanding of the end-users’ competencies has a 
strong impact on the safety of the developed technology and the overall operational 
safety of the organisation. A misunderstanding or lack of understanding of those 
competencies will also lead to a more complex, less user-friendly technology, and a 
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higher cost of the design project. These findings stress that a better understanding 
should be reached in an early stage of the design process and that user-centred design 
is essential for safe design (Norman & Draper, 1986; Maguire, 2001). In accordance 
with existing theories these results further stress the importance for safe design.  
 The underlying factors that influence the understanding of the competencies of 
the end-user are new to this study. These factors: training of the end-users, proximity 
to the end-users, experience transfer from previous projects, learning from tests, and 
the attitude towards automation vs. human action, led, in this case, to an insufficient 
understanding of those competencies by all parties. However, these factors have the 
potential to be optimised, thereby improving the way the designers understand the 
competencies of the end-users. This knowledge could lead to a higher focus on these 
factors in future design projects and as a result increase the designers’ understanding 
of the end-users, and in the end contribute to a safer design.     
 
Conclusion 
Safety is usually seen as a combination of operational safety and technical 
(design) safety. However, this study has shown that the interaction between humans 
and the technology is critical to the safety of the design. Therefore it is not possible to 
solely base safe design on technical features, latent failures are not just technical. A 
more holistic approach to safety is necessary when judging the safety of design, and 
the designer’s understanding of the competencies of the end-users is central to that. 
Hopefully these findings will help raise awareness amongst designers working in 
high-risk industries for more and an earlier focus of human factors in design, and 
contribute to safer designs.  
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